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Abstract	  
	  Recent	   European	   events	   have	   revealed	   that	   some	   EU	   Member	   States,	   including	   some	   South	  Eastern	   European	   (SEE)	   States,	   still	   struggle	   with	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   While	   certain	   rule	   of	   law	  challenges	  may	  be	  due	  to	  past	  legacies	  and	  insufficient	  (or	  insufficiently	  successful)	  transitions,	  others	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  transition	  itself	  and	  of	  contemporary	  socio-­‐economic	  problems	  that	  are	  experienced	  across	  Europe.	  This	  article	  will	  address	  the	  state	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  SEE,	  reflecting	  first	  on	  some	  pre-­‐,	  mid-­‐,	  and	  post-­‐transition	  problems	  relevant	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  these	  countries.	  Next,	  it	  will	  address	  the	  legal	  and	  socio-­‐psychological	  impact	  of	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	   the	  mentioned	  problems,	   connecting	   the	   (mis)trust	   that	   can	  be	  observed	  on	  several	  levels	  (internally	  and	  externally)	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  thus	  demonstrating	  that	  mistrust	  as	  such	  has	   social	   as	   well	   as	   legal	   consequences.	   If	   trust	   (e.g.	   in	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	  safeguards	   or	   in	   those	   who	   are	   entrusted	   with	   safeguarding	   it)	   is	   lacking,	   this	   represents	   a	  problem	  not	  only	  for	  the	  Member	  State	  (e.g.	  for	  the	  functioning	  and	  perceived	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  judicial	   system)	   in	   question,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   EU	   (e.g.	   for	   the	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters).	   Lastly,	   the	   article	  will	   examine	   the	   EU’s	   perspective	   on	   rule	   of	   law,	   drawing	   on	   the	  recent	   EU	   Framework	   to	   Strengthen	   the	   Rule	   of	   Law,	  which	   aims	   to	   ensure	   an	   effective	   and	  coherent	   protection	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   all	   Member	   States,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   some	   other	   EU	  documents	  that	  may,	  in	  our	  view,	  help	  address	  the	  current	  challenges	  in	  European	  rule	  of	  law.	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Introduction	  	  Rule	  of	  law	  is	  a	  complex,	  “essentially	  contested”	  (Waldron	  2002:	  173)	  concept.	  Although	  widely	  recognised	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  ideals	  today	  (Tamanaha	  2004;	  Waldron	  2008),	  “the	   benchmark	   of	   political	   legitimacy”	   (Waldron	   2008:	   1)	   that	   societies	   of	   today	   should	  maintain	  or	  aspire	  towards,	  it	  has	  also	  become	  a	  sort	  of	  all-­‐encompassing	  catchphrase	  used	  by	  politicians,	  NGOs,	  media,	  and	  the	  regular	  John	  Doe	  on	  the	  street,	  and	  is	  often	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  voice	   disappointment	   of	   some	   sort	   with	   the	   existing	   state	   of	   affairs.	   Despite	   its	   “unmatched	  rhetorical	   power”	   (Taylor	   Hamara	   2013:	   11)	   that	   impresses,	   persuades,	   and	   legitimates,	   the	  concept	   remains	   rather	   vague	   and	   is	   used	   differently	   not	   only	  within	   the	   ordinary,	   everyday	  discourse,	  but	  also	  among	  academics.	  While	  some	  see	  it	  as	  a	  formal	  concept	  (rule	  of	  law,	  not	  of	  men),	  others	  see	   it	  predominantly	  as	  a	  substantive,	  moral	  concept	  (that	  says	  something	  about	  the	   content	   or	   quality	   of	   law,	   for	   example	   –	   see	   Finnis	   1980),	   while	   others	   still	   take	   it	   as	   a	  combination	  of	  both	  dimensions	  (Flores	  and	  Himma	  2013).1	  While	  the	  lack	  of	  conceptual	  clarity	  is	  definitely	  something	  that	  we	  should	  aspire	  to	  correct,	  or	  at	  last	  reduce,	  it	  does	  not	  paralyse	  us	  in	   pursuing	   the	   task	   of	   assessing	  how	   this	   concept	   –	   vague	   or	   vaguely	   used	   as	   it	  may	  be	   –	   is	  being	  applied	  (and	  seen	  as	  being	  applied)	  in	  Europe.	  When	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is,	  for	  example,	  being	  assessed	  in	  a	  certain	  South	  Eastern	  European	  (SEE)	  country	  by,	  for	  instance,	  EU	   institutions,	   the	   latter	   must	   operate	   with	   certain	   assumptions,	   normative	   concepts,	  procedural	  and	  moral	  standards,	  or	  normative	  expectations,	  which	   the	  state	  being	  assessed	   is	  supposed	   to	   fulfil.	   When	   noticing	   that	   a	   certain	   Member	   State	   (that	   is,	   its	   state	   institutions)	  attempts	   to	   weaken	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   safeguards	   and	   thereby	   falls	   short	   of	   this	   [371]	   political	  ideal,	  the	  EU	  attempts	  to	  intervene,	  not	  at	  all	  being	  held	  back	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  definition	  or	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  some	  EU	  Member	  State.	  	   Recent	   EU	   events	   have	   indeed	   revealed	   that	   some	  EU	  Member	   States,	   including	   some	  SEE	  States,	  still	  struggle	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Looking	  at	  challenges	  concerning	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  SEE,	  one	  common-­‐sense	  conclusion	  would	  be	  that	  challenges	  may	  occur	  because	  of	  past	  legacies	  
                                                1	  One	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  overviews	  of	  the	  concept	  claims	  that	  scholarly	  conceptualisation	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  not	  much	  better	   than	   those	   of	   political	   leaders.	   The	   authors	   Nardulli,	   Payton	   and	   Bajialieh	   describe	   the	   situation	   in	   the	  following	  way:	  “In	  some	  contemporary	  scholarship,	  a	  Hobbesian	  perspective	  is	  taken	  and	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  synonymous	  with	  societal	  stability	  (Hirshleifer	  1995;	  Dixit	  2004;	  Belton	  2005).	  Political	  conceptions	  focus	  on	  governmental	   constraint,	   namely,	   a	   government	   that	   obeys	   its	   own	   rules	   and	   is	   subordinate	   to	   an	   independent	  judiciary	   (Buchanan	   and	   Tullock	   1962;	   Hayek	   1973,	   1979;	   Dicey	   1915/1982;	   Olson	   1993;	  Weingast	   1995,	   1997).	  Classical	  economic	  conceptualizations	  focus	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  contract	  enforcement	   (North	  and	  Thomas	  1970;	  North	  1990);	  others	  emphasize	  governmental	  transparency,	  efficiency,	  and	  corruption	  (Knack	  and	  Keefer	  1995;	  Mauro	  1995;	  Keefer	  2004).	  Yet	  another	  conceptualization	  treats	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  as	  being	  synonymous	  with	  freedom/	  human	  rights	  (Sen	  1999)”	  (Nardulli,	  Peyton,	  and	  Bajjalieh	  2013:	  141).	  	  
  
and	   due	   to	   the	   countries’	   insufficient	   (or	   insufficiently	   successful)	   transition	   into	   fully	  democratic	   states.	  Yet,	   the	  story	  does	  not	   stop	   there.	  Other	   rule	  of	   law	  problems	   (such	  as	   the	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  ‘state	  capture’)	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  very	  transition	  into	  democratic,	  capitalist	  societies.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  factors	  that	  may	  be	  less	  connected	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	   past	   regimes	   and	   transitions,	   and	   are	   concerned	   more	   with	   the	   contemporary	   socio-­‐economic	   problems	   that	   are	   experienced	   across	   Europe,	   which	   make	   us	   question	   the	   social,	  distributive	  justice,	  the	  dominant	  economic	  model,	  and	  those	  who	  govern.	  	   This	   article	  will	   address	   the	   general	   state	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   SEE,	   reflecting	   on	   the	  countries	   that	   underwent	   transition	   (in	   particular	   Slovenia),	   unpacking	   first	   some	   pre-­‐,	  mid-­‐,	  and	  post-­‐transition	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  these	  countries.	  Next,	  it	  will	  address	  the	   legal	   and	   social,	   or	   socio-­‐psychological,	   impact	   of	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	  mentioned	  problems,	  connecting	  (mis)trust	  (which	  can	  be	  observed	  on	  several	  levels)	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  as	  well	  that	  such	  mistrust	  has	  not	  only	  social	  but	  also	  legal	  consequences.	  Trust	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   affects	   the	   perception	   of	   an	   authority’s	   legitimacy	   and	   consequently	  	  people’s	   cooperation	   and	   compliance	   with	   the	   law,	   thus	   having	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	  “effective	  rule	  of	  law”	  (Tyler	  2003).	  Accordingly,	  if	  trust	  (in	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  safeguards	   or	   in	   those	   who	   are	   entrusted	   with	   safeguarding	   it)	   is	   lacking,	   this	   presents	   a	  problem	  for	  the	  Member	  State	  in	  question,	  for	  instance	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  its	  judicial	  system.	  The	  lack	  of	  trust,	  however,	  also	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  EU,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  mutual	  trust	  is,	   for	   example,	   crucial	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   instruments	   of	   mutual	   recognition,	   which	   are	  progressively	   being	   used	   in	   the	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters.	   Following	   this	  discussion,	  the	  article	  will	  finally	  examine	  the	  particular	  EU	  perspective	  on	  rule	  of	  law,	  drawing	  on	  the	  recent	  EU	  Framework	  to	  Strengthen	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (which	  aims	  to	  ensure	  an	  effective	  and	  coherent	  protection	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law	   in	  all	  Member	  States	  by	  providing	  a	   framework	   for	  the	   resolution	  of	   situations	  where	   there	   is	   a	   systemic	   threat	   to	   the	   rule	  of	   law),	   as	  well	   as	  on	  some	  other	  EU	  documents	  (such	  as	  the	  EU	  Justice	  Scoreboard,	  the	  EU	  Justice	  [372]	  Agenda,	  etc.)	  that	  may,	  in	  our	  view,	  help	  address	  the	  current	  European	  rule-­‐of-­‐law	  challenges.	  	  	  
Pre-­‐,	  mid-­‐,	  and	  post-­‐transition	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  SEE	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  SEE	  Member	  States,	  the	  difference	  or	  challenges	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law	   is	  more	   or	   less	   assumed	   to	   arise	   (or	   to	   have	   arisen)	   from	   the	   different	   economic	   and	  political	  system	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  not-­‐so-­‐distant	  a	  past,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  changes	  that	  these	  countries	  needed	  to	  adopt	  quickly	  on	  the	  way	  to	  their	   final	  goal	  –	  which	  again	   is	  more	  or	   less	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  Western	  European	  ideal.	  Transition,	   it	   is	  often	  claimed,	  has	  either	  not	  been	  
  
complete	  or	  has	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  successful,	  thus	  accounting	  for	  these	  countries’	  problems	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	   Before	   addressing	   these	   issues,	   it	   is	   first	   useful	   to	   remind	   ourselves	   that	   although	  ‘transition’	  is	  more	  commonly	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  period	  following	  the	  ‘turn’	  from	  the	  socialist,	  communist,	   authoritarian	   era	   to	   the	   democratic,	   post-­‐communist	   states,	   the	   singular	   form	   is	  somewhat	   misleading.	   What	   the	   SEE	   countries	   experienced	   would	   be	   better	   termed	  ‘transitions’,	   since	   there	   were	   several	   of	   them,	   distinguished	   by	   kind	   (political,	   economic,	  cultural,	  etc.)	  as	  well	  as	  by	  place	  and	   time.2	  With	  respect	   to	   time,	  we	  can	   talk	  of	  at	   least	   three	  transitions	  to	  date:	  the	  one	  in	  the	  early	  90s	  (changing	  the	  political,	  legal,	  and	  economic	  system),	  the	  one	  of	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  (2004	   for	  Slovenia,	  around	   joining	   the	  EU),	  and	   the	  one	  we	  are	  still	  more	   or	   less	   experiencing	   at	   the	   moment,	   that	   is,	   the	   transition	   instigated	   by	   the	   economic	  crisis,	  or	  ‘crisis	  transition’.	  	   What	   ensued	   from	   the	  90s	   transition	  was	   the	   changing	  of	   laws	   –	  with	   some	   changing	  more	   quickly	   than	   others.	   In	   addition	   to	   criminal	   law,	   laws	   enabling	   privatisation	   and	  denationalisation,	   including	  changes	   to	  constitutional	   law,	  crucially	  contributed	  to	   the	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  followed.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	   led	  to	  good	  consequences	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  repairing	  some	  past	  injustices	  and	  leading	  the	  countries	  closer	  to	  EU	  accession	  through	  the	  legal	  changes	  adopted.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   though,	   some	   things	   deteriorated,	   as	   swift	   privatisation	   [373]	  across	   the	   board	   caused	   many	   new	   injustices	   and	   a	   reduction	   of	   social	   security.	   Comparing	  several	   post-­‐communist	   countries,	   Gosztonyi	   (2005)	   noted	   that	   the	   social	   security	   has	  deteriorated	   in	  each	  and	  every	   country,	   as	  previously	   free-­‐of-­‐charge	   services	  became	  payable	  and	   benefits	   were	   reduced	   or	   became	   more	   difficult	   to	   obtain.	   In	   the	   comparative	   survey,	  carried	   out	   in	   the	   Czech	  Republic,	   the	   former	  German	  Democratic	   Republic,	   Poland,	   Slovakia,	  and	  Hungary,	  the	  loss	  of	  safety	  was	  reported	  as	  the	  most	  shocking	  experience.	  The	  ratio	  of	  those	  who	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   believed	   that	   their	   situation	   was	   worse	   than	   it	   had	   been	   before	   the	  transition	   has	   grown	   everywhere.	   In	   Hungary,	   for	   example,	   61%	   of	   the	   population	   felt	   safe	  before	   1989	   and	   only	   29%	   after	   1989	   (Gosztonyi	   2005).	   	   A	   similar	   effect	   followed	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  transition:	  a	  recent	  overview	  of	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Eastern	  enlargement	  on	  the	  new	  Member	  States	  further	  reveals	  that	  while	  the	  economic	  growth,	  expansion	  of	  trade,	  and	  increase	   in	   foreign	  direct	   investment	  were	  obvious	   gains	   for	   the	   eastern	  EU	   countries,	   it	   also	  involved	  costs,	  as	  the	  size	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  debts	  have	  greatly	  increased	  to	  finance	  their	  successes	  (Jovanović	  and	  Damnjanović	  2013).	  
                                                2	  “In	  this	  regard,	  transition	  does	  not	  merely	  belong	  to	  the	  (semi)past	  of	  societies,	  which	  have	  escaped	  the	  clench	  of	  ‘communist’	  or	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  (or	  ‘totalitarian’,	   ‘undemocratic’	  or	   ‘unfree’)	  regimes,	  but	  is	  also	  (or	  even	  predominantly)	  our	  everyday	  reality	  (which	  will	   in	  all	   likelihood	  continue	  to	  occupy	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  our	  not	  likely	  very	  bright	  future)”	  (Kanduč	  2013:	  618–619).	  
  
	   Among	   the	   ‘teething	   problems’	   experienced	   by	   the	   new	   democracies	   –	   quite	   possibly	  because	  of	   their	   cognitive	  blindness	   linked	   to	   the	  happy	  or	   ‘honeymoon’	  period	   that	   followed	  the	   transition	   –	   there	  were	   various	   harmful	   practices,	   for	   example	   ‘wild	   privatisation’,	  which	  was	  in	  Slovenia	  later	  dubbed	  ‘the	  theft	  of	  the	  century’.	  Observing	  the	  problems	  in	  various	  post-­‐socialist	  countries	  after	  the	  shift	   led	  Gosztonyi	  (2005)	  to	  describe	  crime	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ‘costs	  of	  transition’.	  According	  to	  Dobovšek	  (2012:	  168),	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  market	  economy	  also	  greatly	  influenced	   the	   spread	   of	   corruption,	  with	   ethics	   and	  moral	   values	   being	   “pushed	   aside	   in	   the	  frenzied	  race	  for	  greater	  profit	  by	  individuals	  and	  indeed	  the	  whole	  societies	  of	  these	  countries”.	  	  	   Economic	   criminals	   that	   are	   being	   prosecuted	   today	   were	   at	   the	   time	   ‘great	  businessmen’,	  people	  who	  had	   ‘made	  it’.	  They	  were	  featured	  in	  the	  media	  as	  successful,	  smart	  people	   to	   be	   admired.	   The	   practices	   of	  many	   of	   these	   ‘admirable’	   people	   initially	   focused	   on	  wealth	  accumulation,	   then	  transformed	  into	  power,	  and	   later	   into	  a	  phenomenon	  that	   is	  often	  described	   today	   by	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘state	   capture’,	  where	   the	   economic	   elite	   (sometimes	   called	  tycoons,	  barons,	  etc.)	  de	  facto	  usurps	  the	  state	  by	  forming	  powerful	  networks	  that	  influence	  the	  political	   elite,	  who	   decides	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   State	   but	   in	   favour	   of	   their	   own	   interests	   and	  private	  agendas.	  State-­‐capturing	  corruptive	  activities	   that	  affect	   the	   formulation	  of	   laws	  range	  from	   buying	   votes	   in	   the	   parliament	   to	   offering	   bribes	   to	   government	   officials	   in	   order	   to	  influence	   government	   regulations,	   from	   bribing	   judges	   to	   affect	   judicial	   decisions	   to	   illegal	  funding	  of	   political	   parties	   (Dobovšek	  2012).	   Corruptive	  practices	   can	  distort	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	  while	  [374]	  a	  weak	  judiciary	  often	  fails	  to	  seize	  the	  moment	  and	  reinstate	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  though	  the	  timely	  prosecution	  and	  punishment	  of	  the	  crimes	  of	  the	  powerful.	  Even	  when	  the	  judiciary	  is	  not	   a	  weak	   spot,	   however,	   the	  problem	   is	   that	   state	   capture	   is	   difficult	   to	  break	  down	   into	  individual	   offences	   without	   losing	   sight	   of	   the	   big	   picture.	   Furthermore,	   what	   makes	   it	  particularly	   difficult	   for	   prosecution	   in	   transitional	   societies	   is	   that	   in	   these	   countries	  “distinctions	   between	   private	   and	   public	   actions	   may	   be	   unclear,	   which	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	  determine	  who	  is	  taking	  over	  whom”	  (Dobovšek	  2012:	  171).	  	   To	  a	  large	  extent,	  this	  is	  still	  an	  on-­‐going	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  many	  post-­‐socialist	  or	  post-­‐communist	   European	   countries.3	  Dissatisfaction	   with	   how	   things	   were	   handled	   during	   the	  transition(s),	  resulting	  in	  the	  impoverishment	  of	  whole	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  and	  whole	  regions	   that	   depended	   on	   a	   certain	   industry	   or	   factory	   –	   and	   aided,	   furthermore,	   by	   today’s	  economic	  crisis	  –	  has	  made	  many	  people	  voice	   their	  concern	  about	  capitalism	  and	  neo-­‐liberal	  political	  economy,	  which	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  seen	  as	  propagating.	  The	  cynicism	  towards	  the	  economy	  and	  those	  leading	  it,	  coupled	  with	  the	  mistrust	  towards	  the	  state	  (or	  those	  who	  were	  supposed	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  (or	  lid)	  on	  the	  more	  carnivorous	  aspects	  of	  capitalism)	  has	  led	  some	  to	  
                                                3	  For	  an	  illuminating	  description	  of	  the	  merging	  of	  the	  former	  party	  elite,	  secret	  services,	  and	  the	  new	  political	  and	  business	  elites	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  democratic	  transition	  in	  Bulgaria,	  see	  Slavov	  (2011).	  
  
start	   advocating	   the	   idea	   of	   reviving	   socialism	   –	   or	   more	   concretely,	   ‘democratic	   socialism’.	  Although	  many	  critics	  (and	  those	  who	  have	  lived	  in	  socialist	  times)	  find	  it	  idealistic	  or	  utopian	  or	  plain	  ridiculous,	  the	  idea	  is	  attractive	  to	  many	  young	  people	  who	  live	  in	  a	  state	  of	  precariat,	  having	  no	  steady	  employment	  and	  no	  union	  representative,	  moving	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  workforce	  on	   various	   short-­‐term	   work	   contracts	   (that	   offer	   much	   less	   social	   security)	   and	   remaining	  largely	  invisible,	  despite	  their	  rising	  numbers.	  The	  recent	  (July	  2014)	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  Slovenia	   have	   (perhaps	   for	   this	   very	   reason)	   seen	   an	   unexpected	   rise	   of	   a	   newly	   established	  party,	  called	  United	  Left	  (Združena	  levica),	  that	  not	  only	  entered	  the	  Parliament	  with	  the	  fourth	  largest	  number	  of	  votes	  but	  also	  took	  many	  of	  the	  votes	  from	  the	  parties	  who	  have	  been	  ‘on	  the	  scene’	   since	   Slovenia’s	   independence	   in	   1991	   (one	   of	   them	   being	   the	   party	   of	   Social	  Democrats).4	  This	  party	  has	  been	  named	  the	  biggest	  surprise	  of	  these	  elections.	  Its	  success	  was	  [375]	   explained	   also	   by	   pointing	   to	   its	   27-­‐year-­‐old	   political	   leader,	   an	   ardent	   proponent	   of	  ‘democratic	   socialism’,	   who	   was	   widely	   recognised	   as	   the	   representative	   of	   the	   precarious	  workforce	  (many	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  thus	  far	  too	  disillusioned	  to	  even	  vote)	  and	  held	  his	  ground	  well	  in	  the	  pre-­‐election	  debates.	  	  	  
	  
Rule	  of	  law	  issues	  in	  SEE:	  the	  legal	  impact	  of	  transitional	  challenges	  	  
Impact	  at	  the	  legislative	  level	  	  The	   general	   role	   of	   law	   is	   to	   balance	   diverse	   values	   through	   norms.	   Durkheim,	   for	   example,	  considered	   law	   to	   be	   the	   most	   important	   observable	   manifestation	   of	   the	   collective	  consciousness	   and	   its	   transformation	   (Deflem	  2008).	   Law	  contains	   the	   fundamental	   values	  of	  society	   (thereby	  normatively	   regulating	   it)	  and,	  moreover,	   censures	   (allocates	  blame,	   conveys	  moral	   reprobation)	   the	   violations	   of	   such	  norms	   (values)	   through	  punishment.	   In	   the	   area	   of	  legislation,	   transitional	   changes	   towards	   the	   rule	   of	   law	  were	   in	  many	   European	   transitional	  countries	  mostly	  reflected	  in	  the	  area	  of	  constitutional	  law	  and	  criminal	  law,	  that	  is,	  through	  the	  fundamental	  regulatory	  systems	  of	  society.	  	  	   Criminalisation,	  and	  criminal	   law	   in	  general,	   is	   from	  the	   individual’s	  standpoint	  one	  of	  the	  most	   intrusive	   forms	   of	   social	   control	   and	   repressive	   acts	   of	   state	   power,	   for	   it	   not	   only	  restricts	  one’s	  freedom	  of	  action	  but	  also	  punishes	  infringements,	  often	  depriving	  the	  individual	  of	   his	   or	   her	   liberty	   (imprisonment)	   and	   significantly	   (and	   detrimentally)	   impacting	   the	  
                                                4	  Some	  claim	  that	  this	  is	  where	  the	  parties	  of	  ‘the	  new	  left’,	  such	  as	  United	  Left	  in	  Slovenia,	  Greek	  Syriza,	  German	  Die	  Linke,	  or	  French	  Le	  parti	  de	  gauche,	  get	  most	  votes	  from	  –	  that	  is,	  taking	  them	  from	  the	  old,	  already	  well-­‐established	  social	  democratic	  parties	  in	  Europe,	  who	  have	  “ideologically	  moved	  more	  towards	  the	  liberal	  centre	  and	  now	  wonder	  why	  they	  are	  losing	  votes	  of	  the	  left”	  (Belovič	  2014:	  3).	  
  
fundamental	   rights	   of	   the	   individual	   (Peršak	   2007;	   Erbežnik	   2014).	   During	   transition	   time,	  criminal	   law	   held	   particular	   importance	   for	   social	   justice.	   As	   Goodall,	   Malloch,	   and	   Munro	  (2012:	   xii)	  observe:	   “Emerging	   concepts	  of	   criminalisation	  and	  decriminalisation	  are	  not	  only	  the	   results	   of	   changing	   concepts	   of	   justice	   during	   transition	   and	   post-­‐transition:	   they	   change	  social	   understandings	   of	   justice	   itself.”	   This	   can	   be	   clearly	   seen,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Slovenia.	  After	  Slovenia	  became	  an	  independent	  country,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  changes	  in	  the	  criminal	  law	  was	  to	  remove	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘social	  danger’,	  which	  was	  at	   the	  time	  one	  of	   the	  constitutive	  elements	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘criminal	   offence’.	   Social	   danger	   smacked	   too	   much	   of	   the	   past	  regime,	  where	  it	  was	  commonly	  abused,	  being	  used,	  for	  instance,	  to	  criminalise	  ‘public	  enemies’	  as	  it	  was	  vague	  enough	  to	  allow	  any	  sort	  of	  anti-­‐state	  or	  anti-­‐regime	  conduct	  (mostly	  exercises	  of	   the	   freedom	  of	   speech)	   to	   fit	   the	  mould	  of	   ‘criminal	  offence’.	  Transitional	   criminal	   law	  was	  thus	   also	   used	   as	   a	  way	   of	   dealing	  with	   the	   past.	   Transitional	   justice	   as	   the	   coming-­‐to-­‐terms	  with	  the	  communist	  past	  can	  also	  [376]	  (at	  least	  in	  part)5	  be	  reflected	  through	  the	  transitions	  or	  modifications	  of	  the	  country’s	  (criminal)	  law,	  which	  is	  always	  vested	  with	  people’s	  perceptions	  and	   notions	   of	   justice	   (Peršak	   2012),	   and	   this	   is	   what	   to	   some	   extent	   happened	   in	   Slovenia	  through	   its	   black-­‐letter	   law.	  While	   Slovenia	  may	   have	  moved	   “beyond	   the	   crimes	   of	   the	   past	  without	   the	  benefit	  of	   ‘truth	  and	  reconciliation’”	  (Kotar	  2009:	  201,	  216),	  a	  certain	  transitional	  justice	  has	  manifested	  itself	  through	  the	  criminalisation	  as	  “justice	  on	  the	  books”.	  	   The	  changes	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  were,	  however,	  primarily	  reflected	  on	  the	  constitutional	  level.	   The	  new	  Constitution	  of	   the	  Republic	   of	   Slovenia	  marked	   the	   independence	  of	   Slovenia	  (after	   the	  dissolution	  of	  Yugoslavia)6	  and	  set	   the	  grounds	  and	  principles	   for	   the	   functioning	  of	  the	  new	   liberal	  democratic	   state.	  Before	   the	   transition,	   rule	  of	   law	   in	   its	   full	  meaning	  did	  not	  exist	   (Bučar	  2004).	  The	  Slovenian	  Constitution,	  adopted	  on	  23	  December	  1991,	   therefore	   laid	  the	  foundations	  of	  state	  power	  and	  of	  the	  position	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Slovenia:	  it	  clearly	  stipulated	  that	  Slovenia	  is	  a	  “state	  governed	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  a	  social	  state”	  (Art.	  2)	  and	  that	  the	  power	  is	  executed	  by	  people,	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  (Art.	   3);	   it	   listed	   basic	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   liberties	   (including	   the	   principle	   of	  legality	   and	   legal	   guarantees	   in	   criminal	   proceedings);	   and	   it	   discussed	   economic	   and	   social	  relations,	   while	   also	   including	   a	   chapter	   on	   state	   organization	   (which	   includes	   an	   article	   on	  judicial	  independence),	  on	  self-­‐government,	  public	  finance,	  constitutionality	  and	  legality,	  on	  the	  
                                                5	  This	   does	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	   those	   who	   wronged	   others	   in	   the	   past	   should	   escape	   political	   or	   legal	  accountability.	  6	  Slovenia	   gained	   independence	   on	   25	   June	   1991	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Basic	   Constitutional	   Charter	   on	   the	  Sovereignty	   and	   Independence	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Slovenia	   by	   the	   Assembly	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Slovenia.	   On	   23	  December	   1991	   the	   Assembly	   also	   adopted	   the	   Constitution	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Slovenia,	   which	   has	   been	   later	  amended	  by	  seven	  constitutional	  acts.	  The	  Slovenian	  constitutional	  system	  is	  also	  founded	  on	  two	  Constitutional	  acts:	  the	  Constitutional	  Act	   Implementing	   the	  Basic	   Constitutional	   Charter	   on	   the	   Sovereignty	   and	   Independence	   of	   the	  Republic	   of	   Slovenia,	   and	   the	   Constitutional	   Act	   Implementing	   the	   Constitution	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Slovenia.	   See:	  https://www.dz-­‐rs.si/wps/portal/en/Home/PoliticniSistem/UstavaRepublikeSlovenije.	  
  
Constitutional	   court	   and	   others.	   The	   Constitution	   therefore	   clearly	   stated	   its	   adherence	   and	  dedication	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	   To	  conclude,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  transition	  processes	  in	  the	  90s	  had	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   The	   discrediting	   of	   socialism	   and	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   have	   been	  highlighted	   as	   important	   factors	   that	   “stimulated	   the	   ‘rule	   of	   law	   revival’	   that	   began	   in	   the	  1990s”	  (Nardulli,	  Peyton	  and	  Bajjalieh	  2013:	  140).	  The	  political	  reforms	  that	  ensued	  were	  thus	  aimed	   at	   enhancing	   the	   [377]	   accountability	   of	   leaders	   through	   democratic	   reforms	   and	  strengthening	  civil	  societies.	  This,	  however,	  could	  not	  have	  been	  done	  without	  legal	  reforms,	  as	  “without	   a	   credible	   commitment	   to	   accept	   constraints	   on	   discretion	   and	   comply	   with	   well-­‐known	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  neither	  free	  enterprise	  nor	  democracy	  would	  thrive”	  (ibid.).	  	  
Impact	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  judiciary	  	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  crucial	  for	  the	  health	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  a	  country	  is	  what	  happens	  on	  the	  judicial	  level.	  The	  government	  may	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  jeopardises	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  the	   courts	   correct	   this	   by,	   for	   example,	   annulling	   the	   government’s	   decision	   or	   some	  problematic	  legislation,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  state	  is	  assumed	  to	  function	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  state	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  abiding	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  The	  Roma	  crisis	  in	  France	  can	  be	   taken	   as	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   In	   the	   summer	   of	   2010,	   the	   French	   government	   initiated	   a	  programme	  to	  repatriate	  thousands	  of	  Romanian	  and	  Bulgarian	  Roma	  people,	  demolishing	  their	  camps,	   putting	   them	   on	   planes,	   and	   sending	   them	   back	   to	   their	   countries	   of	   origin.	   The	  European	  Commission	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  “rule	  of	  law	  crisis”	  (Reding	  2013)	  and	  intervened	  by	  issuing	  a	  public	  statement	   in	  which	  the	  Commission	  made	  it	  clear	  that	   it	  considered	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  people	  belonging	  to	  an	  important	  minority	  were	  in	  jeopardy,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  evidence	  of	  a	  discriminatory	  application	  of	  EU	  rules	  on	   free	  movement	  and	   its	  provisions	  on	  when	  an	  EU	  citizen	   can	   be	   deported	   back	   to	   the	   Member	   State	   of	   his	   or	   her	   origin.	   Owing	   to	   the	   EC	  intervention,	   the	   free	   movement	   legislation	   in	   France	   and	   in	   other	   Member	   States	   has	   been	  changed	  and	  aligned	  with	  EU	  law	  to	  provide	  all	  the	  required	  procedural	  guarantees.	  Moreover,	  all	  EU	  institutions	  and	  Member	  States	  have	  agreed	  to	  a	  European	  Framework	  for	  national	  Roma	  integration	  strategies	  (Reding	  2013).	  In	  March	  2011,	  the	  French	  Constitutional	  Council	  declared	  unconstitutional	  and	  annulled	  several	  articles	  of	  the	  law	  that	  had	  served	  as	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  expulsion	  of	  Roma	  people. 	   In	  many	   SEE	   countries,	   the	   transitional	   period	   saw	   changes	   being	   brought	   about,	   for	  example,	  in	  the	  way	  judges	  were	  being	  nominated	  and	  their	  independence	  maintained.	  Modern	  provisions	   regarding	   judicial	   independence	   have	   also	   been	   inserted	   into	   their	   constitutions,	  although	  time	  has	  shown	  that	  some	  pre-­‐democratic	  habits	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  break.	  In	  Romania,	  for	  
  
example,	   the	   government	   and	   parliament	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2012	   adopted	   a	   series	   of	  extraordinary	  measures	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  oust	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic.	  Emergency	  decrees	  and	   laws	  were	  passed,	   aimed	   to	   reduce	  democratic	   checks	   and	  balances	   by	   imposing	   sudden	  limits	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  [378]	  Constitutional	  Court.	  Moreover,	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  were	  being	  subjected	  to	  pressures	  and	  intimidation	  from	  political	  forces.	  All	  this	  has	  raised	  concerns	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  country’s	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  for	  democratic	  checks	  and	  balances,	  and	  judicial	  independence	  (Reding	  2012).	  In	  its	  report,	  the	  European	  Commission	  (2012a)	  stated	  its	  concern	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   limitation	   of	   competences	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   relating	   to	  parliamentary	  decisions,	  and	  urged	  the	  Romanian	  authorities	  to	  restore	  these	  competences.	  The	  pressure	   exercised	   by	   members	   of	   the	   Romanian	   Government	   and	   senior	   politicians	   on	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   were	   furthermore	   declared	   “unacceptable	   interventions	   against	   an	  independent	   judicial	   institution”	   (European	   Commission	   2012a:	   5).	   The	   intervention	   of	   the	  Commission	   helped	   to	   restore	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   constitutional	   court	   and	   bring	   the	  constitutional	  conflict	  to	  an	  end.	  	   In	  Hungary,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Commission	  had	  to	  intervene	  when	  powers	  (without	  appropriate	  safeguards)	  had	  been	  granted	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  National	  Judicial	  Office	  (i.e.	  a	  non-­‐judicial	  authority)	  to	  designate	  a	  court	  in	  a	  given	  case,	  as	  well	  as	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  to	  transfer	   judges	  without	   their	  consent.	   In	  April	  2012,	   the	  Commission	  referred	  Hungary	   to	   the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  for	  two	  infringement	  cases,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  the	  sudden	  reduction	  of	  the	  retirement	  age	  for	  judges,	  prosecutors,	  and	  notaries	  from	  seventy	  to	  sixty-­‐two	  years.	  In	  its	  ruling	  of	  6	  November	  2012,	  the	  Court	  confirmed	  the	  Commission’s	  legal	  stance	  and	  found	   the	   Hungarian	   forced	   early	   retirement	   of	   judges,	   which	   would	   affect	   10%	   of	   the	  Hungarian	  judiciary,	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law	  (European	  Commission	  2012b;	  Reding	  2013).	  
 	  
Socio-­‐psychological	   impact	   of	   the	   transitional	   challenges:	   (mis)trust	   and	   its	  
consequences	  	  Democratisation	   in	   the	   90s	   provided	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   building	   of	   trust	   in	   state	   institutions.	  Institutional	  trust	  had	  been	  significantly	  reduced	  under	  the	  Communist	  regime	  (Letki	  and	  Evans	  2005),	   and	   hence	   the	   new	   democratic	   governments	   have	   from	   the	   outset	   been	   faced	   with	   a	  citizenry	   characterised	   by	   low	   levels	   of	   trust	   (Rose-­‐Ackerman	   2001).	   Some	   have	   noted	   that	  distrust	  and	  cynicism	  could	  have	  been	  labelled	  as	  “the	  predictable	  legacy	  of	  Communist	  rule”,	  as	  well	  as	  quite	  a	  natural	  consequence	  of	  living	  under	  Communist	  regimes,	  since	  even	  though	  they	  varied	  in	  degree	  of	  totalitarianism,	  all	  regimes	  were	  “inclined	  to	  subjugate	  individual	  interests	  to	  those	  of	  [379]	  the	  Communist	  Party”	  (Mishler	  and	  Rose	  1997:	  419-­‐420).	  This	  is	  said	  to	  have	  
  
resulted	  in	  alienation	  from	  state	  institutions	  and	  a	  lingering	  distrust	  toward	  both	  political	  and	  civil	  institutions	  (ibid.).	  	   During	   the	   pre-­‐accession	   period,	   there	   was	   a	   strong	   group	   of	   Slovenian	   intellectuals	  advocating	  a	  resistance	  towards	  joining	  the	  EU.	  They	  believed	  that	  things	  would	  become	  more	  expensive,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  somehow	  lose	  out	  and	  end	  up	  worse	  off.	  Still,	  the	  large	  majority	  welcomed	   accession,	   which	   brought	   with	   it	   several	   expectations	   and	   consequently	  disappointments,	   as	   all	   expectations	  were	  not	  met	   and	   some	  processes,	   such	   as	  privatisation,	  caused	   certain	   social	  discontent	   (Peršak	  2011).	  After	   accession,	  however,	   the	  general	  opinion	  improved	   in	   line	  with	   the	   rising	   standard	   of	   living.	   Recently,	   though,	   the	   general	   opinion	   has	  changed	  once	  again.	  Although	  Slovenes	  seem	  to	  trust	  EU	  institutions	  more	  than	  their	  own,	  this	  trust	   is	   not	   high.7	  It	   does	   not	   help	   that	   several	   Slovenian	   governments	   tended	   to	   blame	  ‘Brussels’	   for	   any	   and	   every	   unpopular	   measure	   they	   had	   to	   take,	   while	   simultaneously	  ‘nationalising’	  the	  more	  popular	  measures	  (which	  equally	  originated	  from	  the	  EU	  institutions).	  ‘Brussels’	  has	  thus	  become	  a	  Leviathan	  or	  a	  ‘folk	  devil’	  to	  serve	  political	  goals,	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  all	  things	  unpopular	  (such	  as	  demanding	  that	  Slovenians	  work	  more,	  pay	  for	  this	  or	  that,	  prove	  that	  they	  spent	  EU	  money	  correctly,	  and	  supervising	  Slovenians’	  every	  move	  and	  punishing	  them	  if	  they	  have	  not	  followed	  all	  the	  EU’s	  ‘bureaucratic’	  rules).	  	   What	   lies	   behind	   it?	   And	   what	   enables	   this	   political	   construction	   of	   Brussels	   as	   the	  abstract	  ‘Other’	  that	  apparently	  ‘dictates’	  to	  poor	  national	  governments	  what	  they	  must	  do?	  The	  underlying	  reasons	  may	  be	  located	  in	  the	  general	  public	  alienation	  that	  can	  be	  sensed	  in	  many	  of	   the	  post-­‐2004	  Member	  States	  –	   that	   is,	   in	   their	   lack	  of	  a	   sense	  of	  belonging	  and	  essentially	  their	  lack	  of	  trust.	  	  	  
Trust	  	  Trust	   is	   important	   for	   various	   reasons.	   It	   is,	   for	   instance,	   essential	   for	   ‘perceived	   legitimacy’,	  which	   affects	   compliance	   and	   cooperation	   (Tyler	   2009,	   2012).	   In	   our	   context,	   it	   may	   be	  important	  also	  for	  democratic	  consolidation.	  There	  are	  three	  levels	  of	  trust	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  our	   purposes,	   which	   will	   be	   addressed	   in	   turn:	   (a)	   public	   trust	   toward	   national	   political	  institutions,	  (b)	  trust	  towards	  the	  EU,	  and	  (c)	  inter-­‐Member	  State	  trust	  (mutual	  trust).	  	   a)	  While	  distrust	  seems	  to	  be	  currently	  endemic,	  post-­‐socialist	  states	  seem	  to	  suffer	  the	  most	  from	  it.	  Looking	  at	  the	  recent	  Eurobarometer	  findings	  [380]	  measuring	  the	  trust	  in	  courts	  (see	  Eurobarometer	  2013),	  a	  clear	  gap	  can	  be	  observed	  between	  public	  trust	  in	  some	  EU	  states	  (particularly	   Nordic	   states)	   and	   post-­‐socialist	   or	   post-­‐communist	   EU	   states.	   The	   socialist	   or	  
                                                7	  In	  June	  2014,	  only	  6%	  of	  Slovenian	  respondents	  trusted	  the	  national	  parliament,	  8%	  trusted	  the	  government,	  and	  37%	  of	  those	  asked	  replied	  that	  they	  trust	  the	  EU	  (Eurobarometer	  2014).	  
  
communist	   roots	   of	   distrust	   have	   partly	   to	   do	   with	   the	   harms	   of	   state	   socialism	   (Ward,	   in	  Hillyard	   et	   al.	   2005)	   and	   the	   general	   fear	   of	   people	   living	   under	   such	   regimes	   that	   the	   state	  might	  be	  listening,	  and	  might	  find	  them	  to	  be	  a	  public	  enemy	  and	  convict	  them	  of	  crime	  against	  the	  state	  or	  the	  People.	  	  	   The	   reduced	   trust	   and	   consequent	   ‘legitimacy	   crisis’	   of	   today	   has	   infested	   several	  institutions	  –	  from	  police	  and	  governments	  to	  parliaments	  and	  courts.	  While	  governments	  often	  come	  under	  attack	  during	  economically	  bad	  times,	  courts	  come	  under	  fire	  if	  they	  are	  perceived	  as	   failing	   to	   deliver	   justice	   and	   correct	   wrongs.	   During	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   post-­‐Cold	   War	  transition	  period,	  judicial	  legitimacy	  had	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  the	  correcting	  of	  wrongs	  (be	  it	  through	  lustration	  or	  repealing	  totalitarian	  laws	  that	  violated	  human	  rights).	  Today,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  sore	  spot	  seems	  to	  be	  particularly	  centred	  in	  the	  area	  of	  financial	  and	  economic	  crime,	  for	  example	   in	   cases	   of	   ‘corruption’	   and	   ‘corruptive	   conduct’	   that	   are	   highlighted	   in	   the	   media,	  critically	   examined	  by	   the	   relevant	   authorities,	   and	   even	  prosecuted	   and	  brought	   to	   court.	   In	  Slovenia,	   such	   cases	   seem	   to	   act	   at	   the	  moment	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	  morality	   and	   the	   collective	  assessment	   of	   ethical	   conduct	   and	   values	   (of	   the	   system	   and	   individuals),	   a	   sort	   of	   societal	  cleansing	   of	   the	   anything-­‐goes	  mentality	   that	   turned	   a	   blind	   eye	   to	  many	   social	   harms	  of	   the	  corporate	   crime	   in	   the	  90s	   (i.e.	   the	   first	  decade	  of	   transition).	  These	  days,	  moreover,	  what	   to	  define	   as	   corruption	   or	   ‘corruptive	   practice’	   has	   become	   a	   type	   of	   ethics	   in	   itself.	   No	   one	   –	  including	  (or	  especially)	  high-­‐profile	  CEOs	  and	  directors	  that	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  corrupt	  –	  seems	  to	  feel	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions,	  nor	  do	  they	  seem	  to	  understand	  what	  they	  have	  done	  wrong.	  Such	  people	  tend	  to	  stay	  in	  their	  positions	  in	  the	  public	  office	  as	  long	  as	  possible,	  often	  until	  the	  finality	  of	  the	  judgment.	  Criminal	  conviction,	  then,	  acts	  as	  a	  conveyor	  of	  morality:	  it	  is	  only	  upon	  the	  conviction	  that	  people	  learn	  what	  is	  wrong	  and	  consequently	  what	  is	  right	  (as	  a	  negation	   of	   wrong).	   In	   such	   an	   ethically	   challenged	   society,	   criminal	   law	   is	   definitely	   a	  centrepiece	  of	  Rechtsstaat	  and	  of	  societal	  development.	  	   b)	  Moving	  away	  from	  the	  issues	  or	  problems	  of	  intra-­‐state	  trust	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  trust	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  towards	  the	  EU	  (i.e.	  EU	  institutions	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  EU),	  the	  challenges	  that	  arise	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  belonging	  (and	  wishing	  to	  belong)	  or	  with	  emotional	  attachment.	   Stoeckel	   (2012)	   has	   empirically	   shown,	   for	   example,	   that	   trust	   in	   EU	   institutions	  and	   attachment	   to	   Europe	   decrease	   indifference	   and	   ambivalence	   about	   the	   EU.	   The	   idea	   of	  belonging	   includes	  preferring	   to	   see	   similarities	   (glass	  half	   full)	   [381]	   rather	   than	  differences	  (half	  empty)	  between	  oneself	  and	   the	  major	  group.	   In	   the	  context	  of	   the	  EU,	   this	  would	  mean	  striving	  for	  Europeanness,	  that	  is,	  seeing	  and	  representing	  oneself	  as	  (also)	  European.	  However,	  considering	  that	  the	  support	  for	  future	  EU	  enlargement	  has	  been	  dropping	  in	  almost	  all	  Member	  States	   since	   the	   early	   2000s,	   including	   in	   some	   of	   those	   which	   are	   official	   candidates	   for	  membership	   (Toshkov,	   Kortenska,	   Dimitrova	   and	   Fagan	   2014),	   and	   considering	   that	   national	  
  
political	   parties	   with	   Eurosceptic	   sentiments	   having	   been	   reaping	   electoral	   gains	   (Harteveld,	  van	  der	  Meer	  and	  De	  Vries	  2013),	  this	  may	  present	  quite	  a	  task.	  	   Some	   research	   shows	   that	   European	   citizens	   trust	   EU	   institutions	  more	   than	   they	   do	  their	  own	  national	  institutions	  (Eurobarometer	  2014),	  while	  others	  note	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  “facing	  its	  worst	  crisis	  of	  confidence”	  (Jovanović	  2013).8	  National	  governments	  add	  to	  this	  by	  using	  the	  image	  of	  a	  distant,	  cold	   ‘Brussels’	  as	  a	  scapegoat	  whenever	  they	  have	  to	  implement	  unpopular	  policies.	  The	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  seem	  to	  fall	  for	  this,	  however,	  indicates	  that	  they	  do	  not	  see	  Europe	  as	  ‘us’	  and	  that	  it	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  belonging	  to	  Europe	  (EU)	  that	  facilitates	  these	  stories.	  This	   was	   also	   recently	   highlighted	   by	   the	   EU	   Commissioner	   Bulc	   (during	   her	   hearing	   as	   a	  candidate	  for	  a	  commissioner	  for	  transport),	  who	  said	  that	  EU	  citizens	  have	  to	  realise	  that	  they	  are	  spending	  their	  own	  money	  and	  that	  therefore	  having	  strict	  supervision	  over	  the	  spending	  of	  EU	   money	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   (rather	   than	   something	   ‘Eurocrats’	   like	   to	   do	   for	   fun).	  Moreover,	   through	   resolutions	   and	   (the	   transposition	   of)	   directives,	   the	   EU	   law	   becomes	  effectively	   national	   law,	  which	   can	   (and	   should)	   lead	   to	   further	   normative	   integration	   of	   the	  ‘received’	   EU	   norms,	   seeing	   them	   effectively	   as	   ‘ours’.9	  The	   extent	   of	   the	   difference	   may	  therefore	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  flux,	  constantly	  [382]	  reducing	  with	  the	  passing	  years	  that	  bring	  with	  them	  more	  and	  more	  EU	  laws	  penetrating	  into	  ‘our’	  national	  legislation.	  	   Still,	   the	  building	  of	  trust	   in	  the	  EU	  depends	  also	  on	  the	  EU	  itself	  (and	  its	   institutions).	  One	   important	  element	   in	  generating	   trust	   (and	   institutional	   legitimacy)	   is	  procedural	   justice,	  or	   fairness	  of	   treatment	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  power-­‐holder	   (Tyler	  2003,	  2009,	  2012).	  Pre-­‐2004-­‐accession,	   many	   new	   Member	   States	   were	   carefully	   watching	   what	   the	   EU	   does.	   What	   they	  could	   observe,	   inter	   alia,	   were	   some	   double	   standards	   being	   applied	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  conditions	   demanded	   for	   joining	   the	   EU.	   For	   the	   ten	   new	   Member	   States	   acceding	   in	   2004,	  conditions	  were	  stricter	   than	   for	  many	  of	   the	   ‘old’	  Member	  States.	  Such	  differential	   treatment	  was	  not	  appreciated,	  however,	   and	   it	   could	  have	  hindered	  subsequent	   cooperation,	   as	  double	  standards	   are	   not	   a	   sign	   of	   respect	   or	   respectful	   treatment.	   The	   theory	   of	   procedural	   justice	  clearly	  establishes	  a	   link	  between	   the	  quality	  of	  one’s	   treatment	  and	   their	  attribution	  of	   trust	  
                                                8	  “The	  current	  crisis	   is	  shaking	  the	  foundations	  of	   the	  EU.	  The	  member	  countries	  can	  agree	  on	  almost	  nothing.	  The	  awarding	  to	  the	  EU	  of	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  for	  peace	  in	  2012	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  pieces	  of	  positive	  news	  regarding	  the	  EU	  in	  years.	   […]	  The	  core	  EU	  countries	  such	  as	  France	  and	  Germany	  are	  drifting	  apart	  (this	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	  serious	  problems),	  while	  others	   such	  as	  Britain	   are	  disengaging	   from	   the	  EU	  project.	   Countries	   in	   the	  EU	  move	  at	  diverse	  speeds	   (Eurozone	   and	   others),	   while	   some	   (Britain)	   are	   moving	   in	   a	   different	   direction	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   EU”	  (Jovanović	  2013:	  2).	  9	  This	  may	  not,	  however,	  be	  an	  easy	  task	  in	  a	  diverse	  Europe.	  Mediating	  among	  the	  plurality	  of	  ethical	  value	  systems	  is	   thus,	   according	   to	  Habermas,	   the	   primary	   task	   of	  modern	   law	   (Deflem	  2008).	   The	  EU	   law	   is	   ‘by	   default’	   such	   a	  modern	  law,	  and	  this	  challenge	  of	  overcoming	  or	  mediating	  among	  the	  plurality	  is	  particularly	  acute	  in	  its	  case.	  The	  mediating	  and	   integrative	   function	  of	   law	  becomes	  more	  needed	  when	  the	  degree	  of	  cultural	  diversity	   in	  a	  society	  rises,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  pluralist,	  multicultural	  societies	  of	  today	  present	  many	  challenges	  even	  to	  the	  national	  law,	  let	  alone	  to	  the	  supranational	  law.	  	  
  
and	  consequent	  perceived	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  authority	  that	  treats	  them	  in	  a	  certain	  way.10	  The	  EU	  is	  such	  an	  authority	  here	  and	  coming	  down	  hard	  on	  new	  Member	  States	  while	  allowing	  all	  sorts	  of	  exceptions	  for	  the	  older	  Member	  States	  cannot	  help	  the	  trust-­‐fuelled	  cooperation	  with	  the	  EU.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  EU	  has	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  own	  standards	  first,	  before	  measuring	  others	  against	  them	  –	  or,	  as	  Wolff	  (2013:	  119)	  puts	  it,	  in	  order	  “to	  be	  a	  credible	  rule	  of	  law	  promoter	  abroad,	  rule	  of	  law	  standards	  at	  home	  need	  to	  match	  what	  the	  EU	  preaches	  abroad”.11	  	   c)	   Considering	   that	   trust	   is	   context-­‐	   and	   place-­‐specific	   (Crawford	   2000),	   attention	  should	   also	   be	   paid	   to	   background,	   historical,	   and	   cultural	   nuances,	   which	   have	   to	   be	  appreciated,	   for	   example,	   for	   the	   EU	   to	   merit	   legitimacy	   and	   generate	   compliance,	   mutual	  respect	  or	  mutual	  trust.	  Inter-­‐state	  trust	  or	  ‘mutual	  trust’	  –	  i.e.	  the	  idea	  of	  trust	  existing	  between	  Member	   States	   that	   lies	   behind	  many	  mutual	   recognition	   instruments	   in	   the	   area	   of	   judicial	  cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   –	   similarly	   has	   to	   acknowledge	   differences.	   Overlooking	   the	  [383]	  differences	  in	  the	  national	  constitutional	  identity	  of	  Member	  States,	  differences	  between	  their	  national	  systems	  and	  their	  perception	  of	  justice	  that	  leads	  to	  “an	  uncritical	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  based	  on	  ‘commanded’	  mutual	  trust”	  (Erbežnik	  2014),	  may	  thus	  run	  the	  risk	  of	   unnecessarily	   creating	   resistance	   against	   and	   mistrust	   towards	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	  in	  the	  EU.	  	   Acknowledging	  diversity,	  at	  least	  in	  law,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  present	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  EU.	  According	   to	  Art.	  4(2)	  of	   the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  (hereafter:	  TEU),	   for	  example,	   the	  EU	  must	  respect	  ‘national	  identities’	  (similarly	  stated	  in	  Art.	  82(2)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (TFEU),	  which	  refers	  to	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters):	  the	  EU,	  it	  declares,	  must	  take	  different	  national	  legal	  traditions	  into	  account.	  However,	  even	  though	  the	  EU	  values	  diversity,	   it	   is	  perhaps	  understandable	  that	   it	  might	  also	  be	  inclined	  (particularly	   in	  its	  policy	  documents	  and	  laws)	  to	  downplay	  national	  differences,	  especially	  when	  they	  may	  lead	  to	  stereotyping,	  discrimination,	  or	  measures	  threatening	  the	   freedom	  of	  movement	  within	  the	  EU.	  Furthermore,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  itself	  presupposes	  that	  certain	  commonalities	  exist	   (or	   should	   eventually	   exist)	   between	   all	   states	   that	   join	   this	   union.	   Within	   the	   EU	   or	  western	   liberal	   democratic	   societies,	   commonality	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   shared	  Enlightenment	  heritage,	  reflected	  in	  the	  commonly	  agreed	  upon	  criminal	   law	  principles.	  Thus,	  despite	  the	  cultural	  variability	  within	  the	  EU,	  there	  are	  several	  fundamental	  values	  and	  common	  
                                                10	  A	   similar	   situation	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   a	   research	   study	   on	   Ukraine	   and	   its	   rule	   of	   law.	   Burlyuk	   (2013:	   208)	  writes	  how	  in	  Ukraine	  a	  combination	  of	  low	  legal	  culture	  and	  “total	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  system”	  is	  reflected	  in	  people’s	  general	  unwillingness	  to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  law	  enforcement	  institutions,	  which	  is	  manifested,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  low	  numbers	  of	  people	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  report	  a	  crime.	  11	  This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   those	   who	   tend	   to	   trust	   an	   authority	   based	   on	   its	   performance	   (including	  procedural	  justice).	  Some	  research,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  people’s	  trust	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  rather	  an	  extrapolation	  of	  their	  trust	   in	   their	   national	   authorities.	   According	   to	   Harteveld	   et	   al.	   (2013),	   a	   citizen’s	   ‘national’	   trust	   was	   a	   stronger	  predictor	   of	   his	   or	   her	   trust	   in	   the	   EU	   than	   trust	   based	   on	   perceived	   performance	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   trust	   based	   on	  identity	  or	  emotional	  attachment	  to	  the	  EU.	  
  
grounds	   (referred	   to	   in	  many	  EU	   legislative	  documents)	  on	  which	   the	  EU	  criminal	   law	  can	  be	  built	  in	  a	  consistent	  way.12	  	   However,	  while	  diversity	  is	  a	  fact	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  taken	  into	  account,	  it	  should	  also	  not	  be	  overestimated	  or	  ‘left	  unquestioned’	  (Goodall,	  Malloch	  and	  Munro	  2012).	  In	  the	   area	   of	   criminal	   law	   and	   criminalisation,	   for	   example,	   much	   of	   a	   country’s	   criminal	   law	  regulation	  does	  not	   involve	  the	  country’s	  specific	  historical,	  cultural,	  and	  ethical	  basis	  (Elholm	  2014).	   If	   it	   is	  mainly	   criminalisations	  mala	  prohibita,	   as	   suggested	  by	  Nuotio	   (2014),	   that	   are	  [384]	  specifically	  connected	  to	  the	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  in	  a	  society,	  it	  is	  therefore	  likely	   that	   more	   ‘core	   criminalisations’	   –	   i.e.	   more	   basic	   harms	   or	   crimes	   (which	   tend	   to	  comprise	  the	  majority	  of	  crimes	  described	  in	  the	  Criminal	  Codes,	  considering	  mala	  prohibita	  are	  still	  considered	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  exception	  within	  the	  criminal	  offences	  proper)	  –	  do	  not	  involve	  this	  specific	   link.	   Furthermore,	   even	   where	   there	   is	   a	   specific	   cultural,	   historical,	   or	   ethical	  ‘difference’	   established,	   an	  argument	   could	  be	  made	   that	   such	   (factual)	   considerations	   should	  not	   always	   necessarily	   be	   followed	   without	   a	   good	   reason.	   For	   instance,	   certain	   cultural	  practices,	   such	   as	   female	   circumcision,	   do	   not	   fit	   into	   the	   European	   normative	   and	   cultural	  framework	  and	  are	  therefore	  legitimately	  not	  endorsed	  by	  law,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  countries,	   communities,	   or	   religions	   in	   Europe	   may	   recognise	   it	   as	   part	   of	   their	   cultural	   or	  religious	  practice.	  	   To	   sum	   up	   the	   issue,	   then,	   trust	   is	   culturally	   calibrated,	   but	   so	   are	   the	   fundamental	  values	  of	  a	  national	  constitutional	  and	  criminal	  system.	  While	  mutual	   trust	  had	  been	  assumed	  when	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  was	  legally	  construed	  and	  put	  in	  place,	  the	  subsequent	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  in	  reality	  very	  little	  trust	  actually	  existed,	  which	  is	  why	  many	  mutual	  trust-­‐based	  legal	  mechanisms	  work	  poorly	  (Vermeulen	  2014).	  Accordingly,	  the	  EU	  is	  now	  trying	  to	   improve	   the	   situation	   by	   making	   policy	   aimed	   at	   increasing	   trust	   among	   and	   between	  Member	   States.	   One	   way	   that	   this	   could	   be	   achieved	   is	   through	   the	   formulation	   of	   certain	  standards	  of	  effective	   justice	   that	  would	  apply	  across	   the	  EU	  (Peršak	  2014).	  Before	   this	  could	  happen,	  however,	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  existing	  performance	  of	  national	   judiciaries	  was	  needed,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  making	  significant	  progress	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  issuing	  the	  EU	  Justice	  Scoreboard	  –	  a	  tool	  that	  assesses	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  all	  Member	  States	  –	  and	  thereby	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  EU’s	  work	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
                                                12	  The	  preamble	  to	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  EU,	  for	  example,	  refers	  to	  the	  values	  of	  human	  dignity,	  freedom,	   equality,	   and	   solidarity.	   The	   preamble	   of	   TEU	   confirms	  Member	   States’	   commitment	   to	   the	   principle	   of	  liberty,	  democracy,	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	   and	   fundamental	   social	   rights.	   Art.	   2	   of	   TEU	   stipulates	   that	   the	  Union	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   values	   of	   respect	   for	  human	  dignity,	   freedom,	  democracy,	  equality,	   the	  rule	  of	   law,	  and	  respect	   for	  human	  rights,	   including	   the	  rights	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  minorities.	  It	  further	  claims	  that	  these	  values	  are	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  pluralism,	  non-­‐discrimination,	  tolerance,	  justice,	  solidarity,	  and	  equality	  between	  women	  and	  men	  prevail.	  The	  EU	  is	  in	  this	  way	  based	  (or	  can	  least	  claims	  to	  be	  based)	  on	  certain	  common	  values	  among	  all	  member	  states.	  
  
	  
Rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  EU	  	  As	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   firmly	   embedded	   in	   the	   EU’s	   primary	   legislation.	   The	  preamble	  and	  Art.	  2	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  refer	  to	  it	  explicitly	  as	  one	  of	  the	  values	  upon	  which	   the	  EU	   is	  built.	  The	  EU	  policy	  makers	  have	   realised,	  however,	   that	   there	   is	   a	   link	  between	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   trust,	   and	   in	   many	   recent	   documents	   they	   have	   specifically	  recognised	  the	  trust-­‐building	  capacities	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	   Accordingly,	  the	  EU	  Justice	  Agenda	  for	  2020	  focuses	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  strengthening	  “trust,	  mobility	  and	  growth”	  within	  the	  Union,	  and	  sets	  out	  [385]	  political	  priorities	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  this.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  poses	  to	  judicial	  cooperation,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  emphasised	  that	  we	  need	  to	  trust	  judicial	  decisions	  fully,	  no	  matter	  where	  they	  have	  been	  taken,	  and	  that	  this	  “requires	  independence,	  quality	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  judicial	   systems	   and	   the	   respect	   [for]	   the	   rule	   of	   law”	   (European	   Commission	   2014a:	   4).	  Regarding	   the	   former,	   the	   document	   specifically	   refers	   to	   the	   EU	   Justice	   Scoreboard	   that	   has	  been	  published	  annually	  since	  2013	  (produced	  by	  DG	  Justice	  unit	  “General	  justice	  policies	  and	  judicial	   systems”),	   which	   provides	   objective	   and	   comparable	   data	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  functioning	  of	  national	  justice	  systems	  in	  all	  Member	  States,	  where	  ‘effectiveness’	  is	  used	  as	  an	  umbrella	   term	   for	   the	   three	  main	  parameters	  of	  an	  effective	   justice	   system	  (i.e.	   a	   system	   that	  ensures	  the	  effective	  implementation	  of	  rights	  and	  freedoms)	  –	  namely,	  independence,	  quality,	  and	  efficiency	  (European	  Commission	  2013;	  Peršak	  and	  Štrus	  2014).	  	   On	   the	   same	   day,	   11	   March	   2014,	   the	   European	   Commission	   released	   another	  document,	   “A	   new	   EU	   Framework	   to	   strengthen	   the	   Rule	   of	   Law”	   (hereafter:	   Rule	   of	   Law	  Framework),	  describing	  why	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  for	  the	  EU,	  why	  this	  new	  Framework	  is	  needed,	  how	  it	  would	  work,	  what	  would	  trigger	  it,	  and	  how	  exactly	  it	  will	  be	  carried	  out.	  The	  document	  begins	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  “the	  backbone	  of	  any	  modern	  constitutional	   democracy”,	   that	   it	   is	   one	   of	   the	   EU’s	   “founding	   principles,	   stemming	   from	   the	  common	  constitutional	  traditions”	  of	  all	  Member	  States,	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  EU’s	  “main	  values”,	  a	   “precondition	   for	  EU	  membership”,13	  and	  that,	  along	  with	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights,	   it	   is	  “one	  of	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe”	  (European	  Commission	  2014b:	  2).	  	  	   But	  what	  exactly	  is	  meant	  by	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  EU	  context?	  In	  2013,	  Vice-­‐President	  and	  Commissioner	  Reding	  described	   it	  broadly	  as	  referring	   to	  a	  system	  where	   laws	  (including	   the	  spirit	   of	   the	   law	   and	   fundamental	   rights)	   are	   applied	   and	   enforced,	   as	   well	   as	   referring	   to	  equality	  before	  the	  law,	  fairness	  and	  due	  process,	  prohibition	  to	  retrospective	  changing	  of	  laws,	  
                                                13	  The	   political	   conditions	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Copenhagen	   criteria’	   include:	   stability	   of	   institutions	   guaranteeing	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  human	  rights,	  and	  respect	  for	  and	  protection	  of	  minorities.	  
  
having	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  judiciary,	  and	  being	  “ultimately	  a	  system	  where	  justice	  is	  not	   only	   done,	   but	   it	   is	   seen	   to	   be	   done,	   so	   that	   the	   system	   can	   be	   trusted	   by	   all	   citizens	   to	  deliver	  justice”	  (Reding	  2013).	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Framework	  recognises	  that	  the	  precise	  content	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  standards	  and	  principles	  may	  vary	  among	  Member	  States,	  but	  it	  also	  asserts	  that	  some	  principles	  can	  be	  distinguished	  as	  the	  core	  meaning	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  that	  those	  are:	   “legality,	   [386]	   which	   implies	   a	   transparent,	   accountable,	   democratic	   and	   pluralistic	  process	   for	  enacting	   laws;	   legal	   certainty;	  prohibition	  of	  arbitrariness	  of	   the	  executive	  power;	  independent	   and	   impartial	   courts;	   effective	   judicial	   review	   including	   respect	   for	   fundamental	  rights;	  and	  equality	  before	  the	  law”	  (European	  Commission	  2014b:	  4).	  	   Until	   the	  Rule	   of	   Law	  Framework	  was	   adopted,	   the	   EU	   could	   only	   respond	   to	   serious	  threats	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   by	   activating	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   Art.	   7	   TEU.	   The	   latter,	   however,	  required	   a	   “clear	   risk	   of	   a	   serious	   breach”	   (for	   the	   preventive	  mechanisms	   of	   Art.	   7(1))	   or	   a	  “serious	   and	   persistent	   breach	   by	   a	   Member	   State”	   (for	   the	   sanctioning	   mechanisms	   of	   Art.	  7(1)).	   Situations	   of	   concern	   that	   did	   not	   fulfil	   these	   conditions,	   however,	   would	   not	   be	  considered	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  obligation	  under	  the	  Treaties,	  meaning	  it	  remained	  unclear	  how	  the	  Commission	  would	  be	  able	  to	  act,	  despite	  recognising	  a	  systemic14	  threat	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  This	  Framework	  was	  therefore	  adopted	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Commission	  to	  address	  such	   situations,	   activating	   a	   three-­‐step	   procedure	   to	   be	   adopted	   before	   a	   situation	   might	  escalate	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  procedure	  under	  Art.	  7	  TEU.	  This	  pre-­‐Article	  7	  procedure	  includes:	  (i)	  the	  Commission’s	  assessment	  of	   the	  situation,	  (ii)	   the	  Commission’s	  recommendation	  on	  swift	  and	  concrete	  actions,	  which	  could	  be	  taken	  to	  address	  the	  systemic	  threat	  and	  avoid	  the	  use	  of	  Art.	   7,	   and	   (iii)	   a	   follow-­‐up	   recommendation.	   The	   Commission	   intends	   to	   seek	   a	   solution	  through	   dialogue	   with	   the	   Member	   State	   in	   question,	   respecting	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	  treatment.	   The	   European	   Commission	   may	   also	   seek	   external	   expertise,	   including	   the	   input	  from	  the	  EU	  Agency	  for	  Fundamental	  Rights,	  as	  well	  as	  advice	  and	  assistance	  from	  members	  of	  the	  judicial	  networks	  in	  the	  EU,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  and	  its	  Venice	  Commission.	  	   The	  Commission’s	  assessment	  and	  recommendations	  are	   therefore	   to	  be	  based	  on	   the	  results	   of	   the	   dialogue	   held	   with	   the	   Member	   State	   concerned,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   any	   additional	  material	   gathered	   (which	   the	   Member	   State	   is	   also	   entitled	   to	   see	   and	   be	   heard	   on).	   The	  assessment,	   for	   its	  part,	   is	   to	  be	  based	  on	   the	   indications	  received	   from	  available	  sources	  and	  recognised	   institutions	   (the	   Framework	   specifically	   mentions	   the	   bodies	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	   and	   the	   EU	   Agency	   for	   Fundamental	   Rights).	   The	   recommendation	   issued,	  moreover,	  should	  indicate	  reasons	  for	  the	  Commission’s	  concerns,	  providing	  specific	  suggestions	  on	  ways	  to	   correct	   the	   situation	   and	   on	   when	   this	   is	   appropriate,	   while	   also	   recommending	   that	   the	  
                                                14	  The	  threats,	  however,	  have	  to	  be	  of	  a	  systemic	  nature.	  Individual	  breaches	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  still	  left	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  national	  courts	  and	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  
  
Member	  State	  resolve	  the	  issue	  [387]	  within	  a	  fixed	  time	  and	  informing	  the	  Commission	  of	  the	  state	   that	   the	   Member	   State	   has	   taken	   to	   address	   the	   situation	   in	   question	   (European	  Commission	  2014b).	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  the	  past	  and	  current	  transitions	  of	  SEE	  societies	  and	  their	  full-­‐blown	  embracing	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  ideal,	  the	  law	  itself	  has	  obviously	  played	  a	  crucial	  role.	  Some	  might	  see	  the	  law	  as	  peripheral	  in	   comparison	   with	   the	   economy	   or	   market	   forces,	   yet,	   inspecting	   its	   mediating	   and	  transformative	   role	   in	   the	   post-­‐1989	   transitions,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   responding	   to	   today’s	   global	  financial	   crisis,	   one	   could	   hardly	   agree.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   laws	   are	   being	  changed,	   regulation	   of	   financial	  markets	   is	   becoming	  more	   stringent,	   and	   laws	   on	   corruption	  and	  fraud	  are	  being	  refined,	  as	  are	  professional	  norms	  of	  ethics.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  law	  is	  reactive.	  However,	   it	   is	   also	   proactive,	   actively	   involved	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   the	   individual’s	   and	   a	  population’s	   morality	   through	   normative	   integration,	   shaping	   collective	   ethics,	   formulating	  normative	   standards	   of	   business	   conduct,	   and	   legitimising	   and	   delegitimising	   (especially	  through	  criminal	  law)	  certain	  conduct	  or	  practices.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  –	  its	  definitional	  fuzziness	  notwithstanding	  –	  is	  so	  often	  invoked	  by	  the	  man	  on	  the	  street	  attests	  to	  its	  moral,	  and	  not	  just	  legal,	  dimension. 	   While	   law	   can	   help	   by	   shaping	   the	   collective	   ethos,	   contributing	   to	   normative	  integration	   and	   delegitimising	   certain	   worrisome	   social,	   cultural,	   political,	   and	   economic	  developments,	   it	  cannot	  do	  all	   the	  work.	  Social	  representations	  and	  people’s	  attitudes	  have	   to	  change	   as	   well.	   Based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   trust-­‐belonging-­‐legitimacy-­‐effectiveness	   nexus	  (indicated	  above),	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  for	  the	  2004-­‐	  and	  2007-­‐accession	  countries	  to	  move	  ahead	  would	  be	  to	  start	  seeing	  EU	  law	  not	  as	  ‘foreign	  law’	  but	  as	  ‘our’	  norms.	  EU	  law	  may	  have	  been	  external	   law	  when	   these	   countries	  were	  not	  members,	   but	  now,	   as	  Member	   States	  with	   their	  own	   representatives	   in	   all	   EU	   institutions,	   they	   co-­‐shape	   the	   law.	   This	   way	   of	   seeing	   things	  would	   help	   these	   states	   with	   their	   sense	   of	   ‘belonging’,	   and	   it	   could	   help	   (at	   least	   partly)	  generate	  trust	  towards	  the	  EU	  and	  foster	  an	  acceptance	  of	  its	  norms.	  	  	   The	  future	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Europe	  (or	  in	  SEE,	  in	  particular)	  is	  impossible	  to	  predict.	  Considering	  the	  old	  adage	  that	  power	  corrupts,	   the	  powerful	  will	  always	  be	  tempted	  to	  usurp	  important	  state	   institutions	  (including	  the	   judiciary)	   to	  serve	   their	   interests,	  which	  suggests	  a	  certain	  continuity	  in	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  stimulated	  by	  power	  struggles	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	   [388]	  diversity	  and	  economic	   fluctuations	   in	  Europe.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  progressive	  engagement	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   this	   area	   can	   provide	   some	   reassurance	   that	   countries	   (particularly	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